Sentencing Disparity in Desertion and Absent Without Leave Trials: Advocating a Return of
“Uniform” to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I. Introduction
On November 11, 19441, the U.S. Army convicted Private Edward “Eddie” Slovik of
desertion in time of war.2 The Army had listed Private Slovik as a deserter for only one day when
he turned himself into the Military Police.3 In a trial lasting one hour and forty minutes, the Army
convicted and sentenced to him to death.4
In contrast, on November 3, 2004, almost sixty years to the day after Private Slovik’s trial,
Sergeant Charles Jenkins pleaded guilty to charges of desertion5 and aiding the enemy.6 The charge
of aiding the enemy carries a maximum punishment of death or confinement for life, the same as
desertion.7 The Army had listed Sergeant Jenkins as a deserter for over thirty-nine years before he
finally turned himself into military custody.8 During his court-martial, the U.S. Army sentenced
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THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK (MCA Universal Home Video 1991). See also WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THE
EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK (1974).
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History Channel: WWII, http://www.historychannel.com/thcsearch/thc_resourcedetail.do?encyc_id=226140 (last visited Oct.
29, 2005). The United States was an active participant in World War II from December 7, 1941 – August 15, 1945.
Officially, war was not declared until December 8, 1941 and formal peace with Japan was not signed until September 2, 1945.
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See PRIVATE SLOVIK, supra note 1.
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Id. Private Slovik was one of forty-nine soldiers sentenced to death in WWII, but his was the only death sentence
carried out. He holds the distinction of being the only soldier since the Civil War executed for desertion.
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10 U.S.C. §885 (2000). This code section details the elements required for a service member to be charged with
desertion. Although Private Slovik was convicted of desertion, 10 U.S.C. §885 was not enacted until May 5,
1950.
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10 U.S.C. §904 (2000). This code section describes what elements must be present to be charged with aiding the
enemy.
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MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL, app. 12, article 104 (2002 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL 2002] (displaying a chart
detailing the maximum punishment available for each article).
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Seattle Times Staff and News Services, Around the Globe, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 20, 2004, at A6.
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him to thirty days in prison.9 The Army released Jenkins six days early for good behavior10 after he
served only twenty five days in the brig.11
Normally, a simple mathematical equation12 assists in showing the sentencing disparity. In
this case, the calculation is not possible and not needed. Slovik deserted for one day and was
executed; Jenkins deserted for thirty-nine years and served twenty-five days in prison: anyone can
see the vast disparity in punishment there.
While this is the most drastic example available, sentencing disparity exists regularly.13 The
disparity exists because the sentencing authority has a high degree of latitude when fashioning the
sentence.14 One would think that with such a degree of latitude given there would be a
corresponding amount of guidance provided, but this is not the case.15 In an organization that
stresses uniformity from the first day of basic training to the last day of discharge, it is baffling that
the military would choose to dismiss uniformity in an area it is most needed.
In the beginning, uniform sentences were a factor the sentencing authority was to consider
when fashioning a sentence.16 The 1969 version of the Manual for Courts-Martial (Manual)17
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Corky Siemaszko, Deserter Tells Horrific Tales of Life in N. Korea, DAILY NEWS (NEW YORK), November 7, 2004, at
News 46. The military judge hearing Jenkins’ case stated that Jenkins had suffered enough living in North Korea
thereby justifying the short sentence given.
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Army Deserter to be Released, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, November 26, 2005 at A24.
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Tribune News Services, Army Deserter Freed After 25 days in Brig, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, November 27, 2004, at C10.
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The mean, average, and deviation of sentences would normally be used to determine if there was a disparity.
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Major Steven M. Immel, Development, Adoption, and Implementation of Military Sentencing Guidelines, 165 MIL. L
REV. 159, 186-90 (2000).
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See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7; Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1002 at II-125. The sentencing authority,
either a military judge or fellow service members, is given the latitude to fashion any sentence from no punishment to
the maximum authorized by the MANUAL for that article.
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Department of the Army, PAMPHLET 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK 60-61 (September 15,
2002) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK].
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MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL ¶ 76(a)(4) (1951 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL 1951].
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MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL ¶ 76 (1969 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL 1969].
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removed sentence uniformity as a factor to consider because sentence uniformity proved difficult to
administer.18
Since 1969, the young men and women of our Armed Forces have been treated unfairly and
subjected to the passions of the sentencing authority. As a result, service members who commit
similar crimes can receive vastly different sentences. Our nation’s best and brightest should be
guaranteed that justice is dispensed fairly and uniformly for like crimes.
This article advocates a return of uniform sentences. Section II discusses the history and
background of uniform sentences, providing the historical use of uniform sentences in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual, including background on why uniform sentences
were removed from the Manual. Section III discusses why the military administers punishment and
the current military sentencing guidelines. Section IV examines desertion19 and absent without
leave20 (AWOL) cases to a show that a sentencing disparity exists. The section will also analyze
desertion cases on the high and low ends of the sentencing spectrum to determine whether there are
just reasons why a disparity exists. Section V proposes the plan for returning the military to
uniform sentences. This article concludes in section VI that the military should adopt the presented
plan to combat the problem of sentencing disparity.
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See infra Section II(B).
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10 U.S.C. §885 (2000).
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10 U.S.C. §886 (2000). This code section details the elements required for a service member to be charged with
being absent without leave.
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II. History and Background of Uniform Sentences
A. History of Military Sentencing Practices
The precursor to the modern day Manual for Courts-Martial was the Articles of War of 1775
(Code of 1775 or Code). 21 The military courts using the Code of 1775 had a great deal of latitude
when fashioning sentences. While types of punishments were provided22 in the Code of 1775, the
severity of the punishment was not detailed for the courts with any specificity.23 The punishment
was only detailed “as a general (or regimental) court-martial might order . . . according to the nature
of the offense [or] in the court’s discretion.”24 The American Articles of War of 1776 continued to
allow the court’s discretion, stating that the character of the offense should be considered when
determining a punishment.25 Although the Code was revised several times, the way punishment
was adjudged remained basically unchanged until 1890.26
In an 1890 amendment the phrase that punishment should be “left to the discretion of the
court-martial”27 was eliminated from the Code of 1874.28 The phrase was replaced with guidance
that the court’s punishment may not, in time of peace, exceed a limit that the President prescribes.29
An Executive Order issued on February 26, 1891, included a table prescribing the maximum
21

Colonel Robert O. Rollman, Of Crimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment – A Short History of Military Justice, 11
A.F. L. REV. 212, 215 (1969) (discussing the early American Code of 1775).

22

Types of punishments adjudged during the time were imprisonment, degrading, whipping, fines, carrying weights,
shaving the head, standing on a barrel and being tied up by the thumbs. Id. at 215-16.

23

Id. at 215

24

Compare id. (the statement “in the court’s discretion”) with MANUAL 2002, supra note 14 (“a court-martial may
adjudge any punishment authorized in this Manual, including the maximum or any lesser punishment”). With the
exception of adding a maximum punishment the court has little more restraint than it did in 1775.
25

See Rollman, supra note 21.

26

Id. at 218

27

Id.

28

Id. at 217.

29

Id.
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punishments allowed for violating each article.30 Military sentencing remained fairly consistent
from the Code of 1775 until the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.31
In the 1949 version of the Manual for Courts-Martial,32 the sentencing authority was
instructed to include uniformity of sentences as a factor33 for consideration34 when fashioning a
sentence. As a result of World War II, the military was criticized for conducting too many courtsmartial and was criticized because many of the punishments were unjust.35 This prompted the
Military Justice Act of 195036 which resulted in the UCMJ and the modern Manual for CourtsMartial of 1951.37 The last major change to the Manual for Courts-Martial took place in 1969
when sentencing uniformity was removed as a sentencing goal.38 While the military has
dramatically changed since its inception in 1775, the removal of sentencing uniformity in 1969
makes the modern Manual for Courts-Martial little better than its predecessor, the Articles of War
of 1775.
B. Why Uniform Sentencing was Removed
The elimination of uniform sentences began in the case of United States v. Mamaluy.39 The
court in Mamaluy concluded that the use of sentencing uniformity by the sentencing authority was
30

Id.

31

See Immel, supra note 13, at 165.

32

MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL (1949 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL 1949].

33

Other factors the sentencing authority was to consider was the accused’s character, previous convictions, and
extenuating or aggravating circumstances. MANUAL 1949, supra note 32, at ¶ 80(a).

34

Id.
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See Immel, supra note 13, at 165. Eighty-five percent of the sentences adjudged during the World War II were
reduced or remitted. Id.
36

Id.
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See MANUAL 1951, supra note 16.
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Compare MANUAL 1969, supra note 17, ¶ 76, with MANUAL 1951, supra note 16, ¶ 76(a)(4).
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United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176 (1959).
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improper.40 The Mamaluy court further stated “that accused persons are not robots to be sentenced
by fixed formulae but rather, they are offenders who should be given individualized consideration
on punishment.”41 As a rule of law, the court stated, sentences in other similar cases could not be
given to the sentencing authority for comparative purposes.42 As a result of the rule of law and the
inability of the sentencing authority to remember similar cases, coupled with the fact that “[m]ilitary
courts have little continuity,” the court concluded the sentencing authority did not possess the
required information to adequately adjudge a uniform sentence.43 Consequently, the court argued
paragraph 76, which states that uniform sentences as a sentencing goal of the Manual of CourtsMartial should be discarded and replaced with instructions of more value. 44
Today, while sentencing uniformity is no longer considered by the sentencing authority, the
Court of Criminal Appeals has been given the task of maintaining “relative” sentencing
uniformity.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has defined sentencing
uniformity very narrowly and only as sentences arising from cases involving co-actors involved in
the same criminal act.46 The result of Mamaluy and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces’ narrow interpretation of sentencing uniformity is that there is virtually no uniformity
in sentences adjudged by the sentencing authority.

40

Id. at 180.

41

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 181.
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See Immel, supra note 13, at 172.
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United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 288 (1999).
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III. Why Punish and Military Sentencing Practices
A. Why the Military Punishes
The reasons the military punishes an offender are basically the same reasons offenders have
been punished throughout history.47 The five reasons include 1) rehabilitation, 2) punishment,
3) protecting society from the offender, 4) deterrence, and 5) maintaining military order and
discipline.48 For any military to properly function, it must possess the tools to compel soldiers to
perform tasks they would rather not perform.49 This differs from civilian law which is essentially
created to deter people from performing certain acts. Why the military punishes is consistent with
the purpose of military law: which is to promote justice, maintain good order and discipline, and to
promote efficiency and effectiveness within the military.50
B. Current Military Sentencing Practices
Current military sentencing practices consist of the court informing the sentencing authority
of the maximum punishment available and then allowing the sentencing authority to fashion the
sentence with little further guidance 51 which often times leads to a sentencing disparity.
When the sentencing authority fashions a sentence, it is given a great deal of discretion as to
its severity. This distinction is in stark contrast to the relatively little guidance afforded them by the
47

Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character
to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1054 (2004).

48

BENCHBOOK, supra note 15, at 61. “You should bear in mind that our society recognizes five
principal reasons for the sentence of those who violate the law. They are rehabilitation of the
wrongdoer, punishment of the wrongdoer, protection of society from the wrongdoer, preservation of
good order and discipline in the military, and deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who know of
his/her crime(s) and his/her sentence from committing the same or similar offenses.” Id.
49

See, Gary L. Wells, Cover Story: Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 CHAMPION 12, 13
(2005) (describing the theory of fight-or-flight). It is in human nature to seek protection when in danger, also know as
fight-or-flight, yet it is the military’s nature to seek that danger for that is where the enemy is located. While some are
motivated by simple bravado to seek that danger other must be compelled into action by knowing the consequence of
failing to act.

50

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at I-1.
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See BENCHBOOK, supra note 15.
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military court.52 The instructions given the sentencing authority are limited to the types of
punishment available and the maximum punishment the accused may receive.53 Except when a
mandatory minimum sentence is required,54 the sentencing authority may prescribe any punishment,
from no punishment at all, up to and including the maximum punishment allowed with no
intervention from the court.55 Beyond the court informing the sentencing authority of the maximum
sentence allowed, the sentencing authority is free to give what weight it wants to the five reasons
for punishment;56 and to take any mitigating, extenuating, and aggravating factors into account.
Other than the above stated directions, the sentencing authority has no further guidance from the
court in fashioning the sentence. The result of this practice leads to sentences of dramatically
different lengths, while the facts remain consistent, thus creating a sentencing disparity.
IV. Analysis of Articles 85 and 86 cases57
Disparity in sentences adjudged can be proven statistically by showing the vast standard
deviation present. Then by comparing cases on the high and low end of the sentencing spectrum,
thereby showing they share similar mitigating factors and the that high end case contains no
aggravating factors it will be shown that no justification exists for the sentencing disparity
A. Statistical Breakdown
Using statistics to breakdown the sentences adjudged it becomes clear that a sentencing
disparity exists. By focusing on a specific article, such as desertion or AWOL, and showing that a
52

Id.

53

MANUAL 2002, supra note 7; R.C.M. 1005(e)(2) at II-133.

54

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at app. 12. The offenses that carry mandatory minimum sentences are spying,
premeditated murder or death that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of burglary, sodomy, rape,
robbery, or aggravated arson. Spying carries a minimum mandatory sentence of death, while the others are mandatory
minimum life with parole.

55

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 14.
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See supra Section III(A).
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Article 85 is desertion and, article 86 is absent without leave (AWOL).
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high standard deviation exists, a sentencing disparity is consequently proven. 58 A sentencing
disparity can be shown by reviewing the standard deviation results.59 The standard deviation is the
average of the difference from the mean.60 Thus, the further the standard deviation number result is
from zero, the greater the disparity that exists.61
First, article 85, desertion, cases are analyzed.62 The maximum punishment that can be
adjudged by the sentencing authority is life, if during a time of war, five years if done with the
intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service, three years if desertion is terminated by
apprehension, or two years if terminated by other means.63 In the cases analyzed, the sentencing
range was between three month and sixty months.64 The average sentence imposed was 26.35
months and the cases had a standard deviation of 17.4 months. 65
Next, article 86, AWOL, has a maximum punishment of one month if not absent for more
than three days, six months if absent more than three days, but not more than thirty days, one year if
gone for more than thirty days and one year and six months if gone for more than thirty days with
absent status terminated by apprehension.66 The cases analyzed had a sentencing range between 39

58

This article will analyze cases without regard to which branch the service member belonged. This is because the
UCMJ is applied to all branches of the military and no where does it state that one branch should impose stiffer
sentences than another.
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Interview with John P. Holcomb, Jr, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, in Cleveland, Oh. (Nov.
10, 2005).

60

Id.
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Id.
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Data on file with the author.
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See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at app. 12, article 85.
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Data on file with the author.
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Id.

66

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at app. 12, article 86.
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days and 450 days67 with an average sentence of 146.7 days.68 The standard deviation for this
article is 107.1 days.69
By focusing the disparity analysis on specific articles and not on articles as a whole, the
standard deviation calculation is not just a general indicator that a disparity exists; but in fact
supports the conclusion that a disparity does exist.70 This is because if articles as a whole were
used, the differences among sentences of the various articles would not be taken into account.71
B. Analysis of Cases on High and Low End of the Spectrum
The following two cases, one on each end of the spectrum from Article 85, desertion, are
analyzed to illustrate that no mitigating or aggravating factors existed to justify the disparity in the
sentences. In analyzing the Article 85, desertion, cases, the focus was whether mitigating factors
were present in the low end case and conversely aggravating factors present in the high end case
that would justify them being so far removed from the average sentence of 26.35 months. After
review of the desertion cases, mitigating factors did exist in the case on the low end, but mitigating
factors that are just as compelling existed in the case on the high end of the spectrum. Thus, there
does not appear a logical reason why a sentencing disparity exists.
The low end case, 72 where the sentence adjudged was three months, involved a sailor who
jumped overboard shortly after his ship set sail.73 His reason for jumping was that his wife, of three

67

Author used days in article 86 cases because many of the sentences are adjudged in days and not in complete months.
Additionally by using days when the sentences are shorter it allows the reader to better visualize the disparity through
the use of standard deviation.
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Data on file with the author.
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Id.
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See Immel, supra note 13, at 189.
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Id.

72

United States v. Buren C. Wimp, 4 C.M.R. 509 (1952).
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months, learned the day prior to his departure that she was pregnant, but was in grave danger of
losing the baby.74 Her doctor had confined her to bed because she was hemorrhaging and feared a
miscarriage; this was to be their first child.75 The sailor was gone for only one day before he turned
himself into Coast Guard authorities.76 Next the high end case is discussed.
In the high end case,77 where the sentence adjudged was five years, the soldier in question
left his unit to return home and assist his family, who had fallen upon grim times. Prior to his
departure, he had served in combat for eleven months in Korea, participated in two offensives, and
received two bronze stars; after which he had rotated back to the states and was preparing to deploy
to Europe.78 His father who owned a 138 acre farm and had been ill for fifteen months, recently had
surgery for cancer; in addition his mother was physically unable to perform the necessary work.79
As a result, the soldier’s assistance was needed on the farm or the family would lose it, and they
would be unable to pay the father’s medical bills.80 The soldier stated that he had no intention of
shirking his deployment to Europe and had every intention of returning. He had also attempted to
obtain a hardship discharge, but it was not approved.81 In this instance the soldier was gone for a
little less than six months before he turned himself into the Army.82
73

On appeal, the court concluded that the trial court errored in finding that the accused had the intent or frame of mind
necessary to constitute the charge of desertion. To court instead found the accused guilty of the lesser charge of absence
without leave. Id. at 511-12.
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Id. at 510.
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Id.
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Id. at 511.
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United States v. Private Calvin Guthrie, 12 C.M.R. 299 (1953).
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Id. at 300-01.
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Finally the analysis, as previously stated, will focus on whether reasons exist to justify the
vast disparity in the sentence adjudged. In the low end case there were several mitigating factors
present: he was gone only one day, he had spoken to his commander about the situation, and his
pregnant wife was ill. Thus, it was reasonable for the sentencing authority to justify a light
sentence. Similarly though, in the high end case there were mitigating factors present: the soldier’s
father was very ill, the family was in risk of losing their farm, he was a Korean War veteran with
two bronze stars, he intended to return after he had assisted his family, and he had attempted to
obtain a hardship discharge. In both cases they intended on returning and had serious family
problems that arguably, if not resolved, could have negatively impacted their performance.
In summation, while the soldier in the high end case was away longer, there are no other
aggravating factors to justify such a severe sentence; but there were several mitigating factors that
would have warranted a reduction in the sentence adjudge. Thus, because the cases are similar, the
mitigating factors are comparable, and there were no aggravating factors present to warrant the high
end sentence: there is no justification for the sentencing disparity.
V. Replacing the Current Punishment with Uniform Sentencing Guidelines
Uniform sentences in desertion and AWOL cases can improve military discipline; creating a
just system whereby all service members will be treated uniformly and not subject to the passions of
the sentencing authority.83 This section will present new sentencing guidelines for desertion and
AWOL and explain why they create a more uniform system.
First, article 85, desertion, guidelines will be presented. The current Manual for CourtsMartial only details the maximum punishment the sentencing authority may give the accused.84
Currently, it allows for death or life in prison for desertion in time of war, five years for the intent to

83

See BENCHBOOK, supra note 15.

84

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at app. 12.
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avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service, three years when the accused intended never to
return to military control with desertion terminated by apprehension, and finally two years when
desertion is terminated by means other than apprehension.85
First, the proposed guidelines differ from the current in that they remove death and life
imprisonment as sentences. Second, the guidelines separate desertion into two categories: the first
is desertion with the intent to remain away permanently86 and the second is where the goal is to
avoid hazardous duty (AHD) or shirk important service (SIS).87
In regular desertion cases where the service member deserts and intends to remain away
permanently, a simple formula was created to determine a sentence. The length of time the service
member is away from military control is matched with the corresponding heading in the proposed
sentencing matrix, as seen in appendix A, to determine the range of the proposed sentence. Next, if
desertion is terminated by apprehension, this fact will be seen as an aggravating factor and a
mandatory additional six months would be imposed on the sentence adjudged. For example, a
soldier deserts for fifteen months and is apprehended, the sentence will range from fourteen to
sixteen months, this allows some discretion on the part of the sentencing authority, plus six months
because of the aggravating factor. Therefore, the sentence adjudged will be between twenty and
twenty-two months.
Because most desertions in AHD and SIS cases occur when units are deploying to hostile
territory or to avoid combat missions,88 the accused is not normally away from military control for
an extended period. As a result of this, the formula is adjusted to compensate so as not to allow
these service members a lighter sentence. In determining a sentence, the length of time away is
85

Id.
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Major Wayne Anderson, Unauthorized Absences, 1989 ARMY LAW. 3, 12 (1989).

87

This category will include cases that arise during the time of war. Id. at 11-12.
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Id.
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again taken from the matrix. Those months are then added to the number of months the unit will be
deployed.89 Finally, twelve months are added to the sentence as a deterrent factor and if desertion
was terminated by apprehension, an additional six months will be applied to the overall sentence.
For example, a soldier deserts when his unit is deploying for twelve months and is gone for one
month. His sentence will be as follows: two to four months for the time away, plus twelve months
for the time his unit was deployed, with an additional twelve months as the deterrent factor. As the
soldier was not apprehended, the total sentence would be between twenty-six and twenty-eight
months.
Next article 86, AWOL guidelines will be presented. The current guidelines call for one
month if the accused is gone not more than three days, six month if the accused is gone more than
three days but not more than thirty, one year if gone for more than 30 days, and one year six months
if gone for more than thirty days and terminated by apprehension.90 Under the current guidelines,
there is no incentive for a service member to return to military control if gone for more than thirty
days and additionally someone gone for thirty-one days could receive a stiffer sentence than
someone gone for 250 days.
Under the proposed changes, as shown in Appendix B, the time away is graduated to give
service members who go AWOL an incentive to return, as well as providing uniformity to
sentences. With the proposed changes, two service members that are gone for 180 days will both
receive between six and seven month sentences. No longer will a service member gone for four
years receive a similar sentence of a service member gone one month.91

89

This is done so a service member does not possibly receive a lighter sentence than the unit was in hostile territory. If
they could possibly receive a lighter sentence it might seem like a better choice for some to desert.

90

See MANUAL 2002, supra note 7, at app. 12, article 86.
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Compare United States v. Andre A Williams, 21 M.J. 360 (1986) (adjudging an original sentence of two months
confinement when the service member had been AWOL for three years), with United States v. Private Milton B. Coglin,
10 M.J. 670, 671 (1981) (adjudging an original sentence of four months confinement when the service member had
been AWOL for 19 weeks).
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The benefit of the proposed guidelines is that sentencing uniformity will be achieved and
still uphold the long standing rule that other case’s sentences not be given to the sentencing
authority.92 Under the proposed guideline, the length of time the service members remain away and
whether they are apprehended are the determining factors surrounding the amount of time the
sentencing authority adjudges. With the proposed guidelines, service members will know the
penalties they face before they go AWOL or desert and are not misguided by the few cases where
the penalty was very light. Finally, at long last, the punishment will fit the crime.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, returning sentencing uniformity to the Uniform Code of Military Justice will
punish the accused based on the severity of the crimes they commit not based on the passions of the
sentencing authority. As desertion and to a lesser extent AWOL is a crime the service member
actively chooses to commit,93 knowing the severity of the sentence may in itself prevent it from
happening. The guidelines created will also provide service members an incentive once the crime is
committed to return to military control, preventing apprehension and thus a longer sentence. The
military prides itself on uniformity and treating everyone equally, just because a crime is committed
does not mean they should suddenly be an individual once more.
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United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180 (1959).

93

See Anderson, supra note 86 (explaining the elements required for article 85, desertion, and article 86, absent without
leave).
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Sentence Matrix
Time Away from Military Control
0 months - 6 months
6 months - 12 months
12 months - 18 months
18 months - 24 months
< 24 months

Proposed Sentence
2 - 4 months in prison
8 - 10 months in prison
14 - 16 months in
prison
20 - 22 months in
prison
26 months in prison

Aggravating Factors (Apprehension)
Add 6 months
Normal Desertion Cases
(Length of time from Matrix + Aggravating Factors)
Example: Gone 8 months and apprehended: 8-10 months PLUS 6 months = 14-16 months sentence
AHD/SIS Cases
((Length of time from Matrix) + ((Amount of time unit will be deployed (12 mth assumption)) + ((12 months (Deterent Factor)) + (Aggravating
Factors))
Example: Gone 3 days, unit deployed 12 months, no apprehension: 2-4 months PLUS 12 months PLUS 12 months = 26-28 month sentence
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APPENDIX B
Proposed Sentence Matrix
Time Away From Military
Control
Less than 30 days
31 days - 90 days
91 days - 150 days
151 days - 210 days
211 days - 290 days
291 days - 365 days
More than 365 days

Proposed Sentence
1 Month
2 - 3 Months
4 - 5 Months
6 - 7 Months
8 - 9 Months
10 - 11 Months
1.5 Years

Aggravating Factors (Apprehension)
Add 3 months
Example: Gone 180 days and apprehended: 6-7 months PLUS 3 months = 9-10 months
sentence
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